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a b s t r a c t
Dairy farms were identiﬁed, which can be included in a contingency plan set up to prevent or mitigate
the consequences of deliberate contamination of a food supply chain. The deliberate introduction of a
contamination into the supply chain of milk was simulated in a scenario where milk producers serve as
the entry sources and consumers of milk represent the target to be affected by the contamination. It is
shown that the entry sources have an impact on the damage caused, i.e. in terms of the number of
consumers reached. A contingency plan is provided that contains a list of entry sources ranked according
to their impact on the damage to consumers. To generate this list, a computer program was developed
that simulates the impact of the contaminations on consumers via the trade of contaminated milk.
Possible variations in the trade links between milk producers, dairies and consumers as well as between
dairies are considered. It is investigated how these trade links alter the generated list of entry sources.
The results indicate that, regardless of the actual milk trade ﬂow, control measures should be
introduced on 39% of the milk producers in order to minimize the damage. The identiﬁcation of suitable
entry sources may help risk managers to focus on these farms in a contingency plan that improves the
sensitivity of control activities related to deliberate contamination.
& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
1. Introduction
Risks in supply chains can come from a large number of
sources [1–9] and thus their prevention leads to a broader view
of risk management [10]. For example in the study of Wu and
Olson [11], ﬁnanced risks of enterprises were addressed and
models were applied in order to support their investment
decision-making [11]. Other studies estimated the risks of a food
contamination in order to provide the risk-informed decision-
making on food safety management issues [12,13]. However,
Enterprise Risk and Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) have
attracted a great deal of attention, especially in recent years [14].
But there are slightly different views on ERM [14,15]. In general,
ERM is deﬁned as a systematic and integrating approach to
managing all risk factors which an organization is faced with
[15] and thus represents the most effective way for companies to
manage or mitigate their risks [10]. Besides [15], COSO [16]
deﬁnes ERM as “a process [that is] effected by an entity's board
of directors, management and other personnel, applied in strat-
egy setting and across the enterprise, designed to identify
potential events that may affect the entity, and manage risk to
be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance
regarding the achievement of entity objectives”. Similarly, Olson
and Wu [17] deﬁne ERM as “the integrated process of identiﬁca-
tion, analysis and either acceptance or mitigation of uncertainty
in investment decision making”. Against this theoretical back-
ground, our research framework rests on the deﬁnition of risk
management provided by [17] with a focus on the decision-
making of supplier selection under consideration of their vulner-
ability to terrorist entry sources. The food supply chains are
tempting targets for terrorists as attacks on these systems may
destabilize the economy and disrupt the ﬂow of foods [18].
Defense preparedness in this ﬁeld is often in the hand of the
private sector [19]. For example, companies in the food sector
apply for certiﬁcations of their food defense management
strategies [20]. Rasco and Bledsoe [19] claimed that about
80% of consumers consider the food supply as vulnerable to
attacks. Several incidents of intentional contamination in
the food supply chain underline its vulnerability [21–25]. For
instance, at least 751 people were affected due to deliberate
contamination of salad bars in Oregon, USA, in 1984 by members
of a religious commune [25–27]. Another case occurred in 2003,
where approximately 100 people were affected after consumption
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of ground beef that had been contaminated by a supermarket emp-
loyee [25,28]. According to Sobel et al. [29], an intentional contam-
ination of the food supply may be similar to an accidental con-
tamination. In this context, the likely size of damage caused by an
attack can be inferred from observed unintentional foodborne
disease outbreaks [29]. In 1994, for example, a large outbreak of
Salmonella enteritidis in the United States affected approximately
224,000 people after accidental contamination of pasteurized liquid
ice cream [22,29,30].
However, the above mentioned studies are based on the assu-
mption that the selection of the entry sources for a deliberate
contamination of the supply chain can be random, because the
consequences of deliberate of accidental contaminations cannot be
distinguished from each other.
In this paper, we concentrate on the hypothetical threat posed by
a deliberate introduction of a pathogen or toxins into the milk supply
chain. We focus on a scenario, where the milk producer (dairy farm)
is used as the entry source for a contamination and where milk
consumers are the target of the attack [13]. We assume that a
potential attacker would aim at reaching a maximum spread of the
contaminated milk and at using a minimum number of milk
producers as entry sources for the contamination. Ideally, the
attacker would aim at reaching the maximal spread of contaminated
milk by contaminating the ﬁrst milk producer in the network of milk
trade. If the attacker was not stopped after the ﬁrst assault, he would
contaminate another milk producer as a second entry source if this
contamination cause larger increase of infected consumers compared
to the ﬁrst entry sources. The attacker has achieved his goal, when all
consumers have been supplied with the contaminated milk. Due to
the fact that the milk trade between milk producers, dairies and
consumers as well as between dairies in the milk supply chain is
dynamic [31,32], we hypothesize that trade links may inﬂuence the
selection of milk producers that are used as the entry sources for the
contamination by the attacker.
However, the most important task during a foodborne outbreak
is to identify the source of the food contamination and its entry
sources [33]. Thus, the aim of this paper is to provide the following
information for risk managers on the chosen scenario: Firstly,
which entry sources would be chosen by a hypothetical attacker, if
data on the commodity ﬂows became publicly available? Secondly,
how many entry sources would the attacker have to choose to
reach all consumers with contaminated milk in Germany? Thirdly,
in which sequence would an attacker choose potential entry
sources? Fourthly, are there milk producers who can be selected
independent of the ﬂow of milk to induce maximum damage?
Fifthly, in the context of ERM, what strategies can be derived to
prevent or mitigate the consequences of deliberate contamination
with scant resources? These questions were answered by propos-
ing a contingency plan.
To prevent that the results of this research are used as an
instruction for a potential attacker, we work with highly aggregated
and anonymous data. Moreover, we use a random gravity model to
generate the trade connections between the actors in the milk
supply chain. Furthermore, we focus on the spread of hypothetically
contaminated milk via trade. Our investigation does take any
features into account that are speciﬁc for particular milk producers,
such as bio-security measures. Nevertheless, we expect that con-
tamination of milk in dairy plants is less likely than in farms due to
restricted access to the dairy plants. Relevant characteristics of milk,
the kind of biological agents or toxins, individual dispositions like
the age of people [34–37] and internal processes like pasteurization
[38–43], which may inﬂuence the vulnerability of the consumers to
contamination, but also the spread of contamination [32], are not
considered in this paper.
2. Material and methods
2.1. The generation of the milk trade network
The underlying milk trade network has been described in detail
elsewhere [32]. In brief, the term “milk trade network” comprises the
trade connections between milk producers (P) and dairies (D), dairies
and consumers (C) and the trade connections between dairies. On
the one hand, the horizontal ﬂow of milk between dairies (inter-
dairy trade) and on the other hand, the vertical ﬂow (without inter-
dairy trade) between milk producers, dairies and consumers is taken
into account. All milk producers of a country and all consumers of a
municipality were aggregated into one milk producer node or one
consumer node, respectively. The milk trade network consists of
12,597 nodes, with P¼294, D¼80 and C¼12,223.
Data on the trade relations from milk producer nodes to dairy
nodes are available in accordance with the German law of market
regulations for goods (Marktordnungsmeldeverordnung). Infor-
mation on the trade connections between dairy nodes and
consumer nodes as well as between dairy nodes was not avail-
able and these trade connections were predicted through a
standard randomized gravity model [32]. The standard rando-
mized gravity model [44–47] was based on the assumption that
the probability of two market actors trading with each other is
proportional to the supply and demand of the respective actors
and indirectly proportional to their distance to each other
[32,46,48]. Further information on the generation of the German
milk trade network can be found in [32]. However, different trade
networks are required due to the random nature of the model
[32]. One hundred different trade networks were therefore
created, consisting of 50 trade networks with inter-dairy trade
and 50 without inter-dairy trade.
2.2. Greedy algorithm and objective functions
To identify the number and the rank-order of milk producer
nodes, which may cause maximum damage in terms of the
number of contaminated consumer nodes, the greedy algorithm
was used. This algorithm can solve optimization problems [49–51]
and is applied under the predetermined objective function to ﬁnd
the most appropriate milk producer nodes (P) as entry sources for
a contamination to cause maximum damage on the condition that
maximum spread of contaminated milk in association with a
maximum number of contaminated consumer nodes (C), so that
the number of milk producer nodes involved in spreading the
contamination is minimal (Eq. (1)).
max j c : cAC; min p : pAP 
 ; pAD; cAD;DAR
 j ð1Þ
In this context, there is a second condition requiring that trade
connections between milk producer nodes and dairy nodes (p A
D) as well as between dairy nodes and consumer nodes (c A D)
exist. Furthermore, the condition should be reﬂexive and transi-
tive (R), as trade connections between dairy nodes should be
considered in our model. However, the objective function con-
siders only the trade volume (v) and the trade connections of the
milk producer nodes, their associated dairy nodes and the
consumer nodes.
294 candidate of entry sources were hypothetically contami-
nated in the computer simulations, selected and sorted according
to the extent of the resulting damage caused dependent on the
respective milk trade ﬂow.
The greedy algorithm starts with the identiﬁcation of the
candidate set of solutions. A candidate is selected for the solution
when it maximizes the selection function. Let S represent the
ordered set of selected candidates and si is a member of this
ordered set at position i. Each member of the set is assigned a
value Δv(si). This value represents the additional weighted num-
ber of contaminated consumer nodes, when the milk producer
node s is added to the set of solutions. The weight (wi¼ i1)
depends on the position (i) of the milk producer node in the
ranked list of solutions (i¼1,…, n). With respect to the objective
function, a milk producer node is only added to the list if Siþ14Si
with Si ¼∑ni Δv si wið Þ. Therefore, the greedy algorithm searches for
the “best” milk producer node according to the number of
contaminated consumer nodes, sets this milk producer node on
the ﬁrst position in the list of potential entry sources and then
follows with the “next-best” milk producer node (Fig. 1). As a
consequence, every place in the list can be ﬁlled by only one milk
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producer node. The greedy algorithm cannot handle the theore-
tical case where two milk producer nodes have exactly the same
value and should therefore occupy the same place in the list of
potential entry sources.
The algorithm stops when Si cannot be improved any more or,
in other words, when all consumer nodes (C) are contaminated
(Fig. 1). The scenario, in which all consumers are reached,
represents a worst-case situation. The greedy algorithm was
applied for two kinds of milk trade networks, one with inter-
dairy trade and one without. We therefore obtained two con-
tingency plans over 50 simulations for each kind of the milk trade
network. One simulation represents one sub-trade network.
Step (1): Contamination of a milk producer node and calculat-
ing the number of consumer nodes that can be hypothetically
contaminated (absolute); Step (2): Selecting the milk producer
nodes that have reached the maximum number of consumer
nodes. The milk producer node with the maximum number of
infected consumer nodes was used as a baseline for further
evaluations of milk producer nodes; Step (3): Select the
second-best milk producer node, on the condition that it has
infected other consumer nodes than the ﬁrst milk producer node
(maximum increase for the ﬁrst milk producer node); Step (4):
Sorting the milk producer nodes according to extent of damage
leading to a rank-order of the milk producer nodes in the
contingency plan.
To answer the question, whether milk producer nodes can be
used regardless of the ﬂow of milk as appropriate entry sources for
a contamination, a comparison between the two contingency
plans according to the most commonly observed portals of entry
was conducted. To achieve a better comparison between the milk
producer nodes, which may occur in both contingency plans, and
those, which are only included in one of the contingency plans, the
impact of these milk producer nodes for the damage situation was
determined with Eq. (2).
IðpÞ ¼ ∑
r
i ¼ 1
hðrÞgðrÞ ð2Þ
The impact of milk producer nodes I(p) is calculated using its
rank (r) (position) in the ordered contingency plan determined by
the greedy algorithm for each of the considered random networks.
Let h(r) be the frequency of (p) at position (r) using all simulation
results, where g(r) is a weight, g(r)¼(rþ1) i. The value of r is
determined by the greedy algorithm and resembles the maximum
size (length of the contingency plan) of the best-ordered milk
producer nodes in random network considered.
3. Results
The contingency plan includes the number and rank-order of
milk producer nodes for inducing the maximum damage situation
as well as the associated number of contaminated consumer nodes
(Figs. 2 and 3) for the two kinds of trade networks (with and
without inter-dairy trade). In Figs. 2 and 3(b), each line represents
a simulation process of a total of 50 simulations. Each line
represents the number of milk producer nodes which are involved
in the worst-case situation per simulation. Furthermore, each
column shows the rank of the milk producer nodes for the
worst-case situation according to the reached number of consu-
mer nodes. Figs. 2 and 3(a) depict the damage situation in respect
to hypothetically contaminated consumer nodes in association
with the rank-order of the milk producer nodes.
When the inter-dairy trade structures are taken into account,
the entire contingency plan includes 86 (29.2%) different milk
producer nodes from a total of 294 (100%). For all 50 simulations,
the greedy algorithm calculated that the minimum required
number of milk producer nodes to achieve the worst-case situa-
tion was seven and that the maximum number of milk producer
nodes was 13 (Fig. 2(b)). On average, by the introduction of a
contamination into nine milk producer nodes a worst-case situa-
tion can be introduced. More than 94% of the consumer nodes
could be contaminated upon introduction of the hypothetical
pathogen or toxins into the milk producer nodes on the ﬁrst rank
of the contingency plan (Fig. 2(b)). The milk producer nodes on the
second rank led to a further increase of the damage situation of 1–
2% (Fig. 2(a)). All subsequent milk producer nodes induce a
minimal increase in the number of contaminated consumer nodes
by 1– 4%.
One milk producer node (ID: 294) was identiﬁed in 49 out of 50
simulations (Fig. 2(b)). Two milk producer nodes (ID: 66 and 500)
showed up in 89% of all simulations. The remaining 83 milk
producer nodes appeared on average 3.6 times in the simulations.
In all simulations, 27 different milk producer nodes appeared only
once (Fig. 2(b)).
One milk producer node (ID: 294) was on the ﬁrst rank in 26 of
50 simulations (Fig. 2(b)). In all remaining simulations, this milk
producer node ranked second (n¼13) or third rank (n¼10) in the
contingency plan. Such “direct neighborhood” ranking of milk
producer nodes in the contingency plan was observed for 68
(79.1%) nodes in all simulations (Fig. 2(b)).
If the inter-dairy trade is neglected, a worst-case situation
could be caused on average by 18.4 (minimum 15, maximum 20)
contaminated milk producer nodes (Fig. 3(b)). The contingency
Fig. 1. Steps of the greedy algorithm (without inter-dairy trade).
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Fig. 2. Contingency plan taking inter-dairy trade into account in association with the hypothetically contaminated consumer nodes. (a) Size of the damage situation with
respect to the number of hypothetically contaminated consumer nodes per rank-order of the milk producer nodes. Each point represents the damage caused by a milk
producer node in the underlying column of 2b. (b) Results of a total of 50 simulations. Each line shows the number of milk producer nodes that are involved in the worst-case
situation per simulation; each column shows the rank-order of the milk producer nodes for the worst-case situation according to reached number of consumer nodes. The
milk producers on the ﬁrst rank caused the maximum damage situation. The milk producer nodes on the second place caused the largest increase of infected consumer
nodes compared to the ﬁrst milk producer nodes.
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plan contained a total of 76 (25.8%) different milk producer nodes
(Fig. 3(b)). The milk producer nodes with the highest rank in the
contingency plan could infect more than 68% of all consumer
nodes (Fig. 3). The milk producer nodes on the second rank led to a
maximal further increase of the damage situation of 12.2% (Fig. 3
(a)). In contrast to the results for scenario with the inter-dairy
trade, we always found the same milk producer node (ID: 100) on
the ﬁrst rank in all simulations in the scenario without inter-dairy
trade (Fig. 3(b)). Moreover, three milk producer nodes were found
in all 50 performed simulations, but on the ranks 2–5. All other 72
milk producer nodes were identiﬁed ten times on average in the
simulations on the ranks 2–20.
A “direct neighborhood” ranking of milk producer nodes in the
contingency plan without inter-dairy trade was identiﬁed for 63
(82.9%) nodes in all simulations (Fig. 3(b)).
The contingency plan without inter-dairy trade contained 29
milk producer nodes that were not included in the plan that took
inter-dairy trade into account (Fig. 4(b)). These milk producer
nodes were on average 7.7 times included in all simulations and
were between ranks 2 and 19 in the rank-order. Conversely, 39
milk producer nodes existed in the contingency plan with inter-
dairy trade that were not included in the plan without inter-dairy
trade (Fig. 4(b)). These milk producer nodes had ranks between
1 and 9 in the rank-order and appeared on average 3.4 times in the
Fig. 3. The contingency plan without inter-dairy trade in association with the hypothetically contaminated consumer nodes. (a) Size of the damage situation with respect to
the number of hypothetically contaminated consumer nodes per rank-order of milk producer nodes. Each point represents the damage caused by a milk producer node in the
underlying column of 3b. (b) Results of 50 simulations. Each line shows the number of milk producer nodes that are involved in the worst-case situation per simulation; each
column shows the rank-order of the milk producer nodes for the worst-case situation according to reached number of consumer nodes. The milk producers on the ﬁrst rank
caused the maximum damage situation. The milk producer nodes on the second place caused the largest increase of infected consumer nodes compared to the ﬁrst milk
producer nodes.
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simulations. 64% of these milk producer nodes were involved
twice at the maximum in all performed simulations.
In order to determine the impact of the milk producer nodes for a
contingency plan, we used the maximum number of participating milk
producer nodes (r¼20) as obtained from the greedy-algorithm calcu-
lation (Fig. 3(b)). In this context, the maximum impact (Imax(p)) of a
milk producer in the contingency plan is 2000, if the milk producer
node is identiﬁed on the ﬁrst rank (rmax¼20) in all 100 simulations.
Fig. 4(a) shows the common intersection of the both contingency plans.
47 (29.0%) of the milk producer nodes were present in both plans and
therefore relevant regardless of the milk ﬂow. The maximum impact of
a milk producer node in the contingency plan was 1220 and the
minimum 14. The average impact of the milk producer nodes was 260.
If the impact of the common milk producer nodes in the contingency
plan is compared separately for the trade ﬂowswith andwithout inter-
dairy trade, it becomes clear that the milk producer nodes that have a
high impact in the trade network without inter-dairy trade do not have
the same level of importance for the trade ﬂows with inter-dairy trade
(Fig. 4(a)). No clear correlation (R¼0.013) existed between these milk
producer nodes regarding their impact on a damage situation. In this
context, the milk producer nodes in the plan without inter-dairy trade
had a 33.5% higher impact on the damage than the nodes in the list
with inter-dairy trade.
Fig. 4(b) shows that the milk producer nodes in the contin-
gency plan with inter-dairy trade possess on average half of the
impact for a damage situation as the milk producer nodes in the
contingency plan without inter-dairy trade.
4. Discussion
The assessment of the consequence of a deliberate or accidental
release of a contamination in a food supply chain can only be done
Fig. 4. Impact of milk producer nodes, (a) present in both contingency plans or (b) in only one of the contingency plans.
B. Pinior et al. / Omega 53 (2015) 41–4846
by computer simulation. The simulation results obtained in this
study are only valid for the scenario described in the introduction
and summarized in Eq. (1).
Conﬁdential handling of data on supply structures related to
deliberate contamination is important. This implies to realize the
balancing act between creating knowledge for risk managers and to
avoid creating instructions for an attack. On the one hand, the
information provided for risk managers should answer the question
“what should be done?” [52] in case of an attack or a threat of an
attack. On the other hand, risk managers who use the results of
simulation should understand the strengths and weaknesses of
simulation results to avoid incorrect conclusions [53].
The strengths of simulations result from the fact that new
insights for risk managers are provided, which cannot be offered
by other means.
Our results showed that 60% of the milk producer nodes are not
suitable as possible entry sources in our model because only 25.8%
(without inter-dairy trade n¼76) and 29.2% (with inter-dairy trade
n¼86) of the milk producer nodes as entry sources were identiﬁed
in a total of 294 possible entry sources for each contingency plan.
29% of the milk producer nodes were present in both contingency
plans and therefore relevant regardless of the milk ﬂow. Especially
the milk producer node with the ID 100 proved as important for
risk managers because this milk producer node was found in 66
out of 100 simulations as the “best” milk producer node for a
maximum spread of hypothetically contaminated milk. This milk
producer represents a suitable entry source regardless of the ﬂow
of milk. Our ﬁndings indicate that cost- and time-efﬁcient identi-
ﬁcation of such milk producer nodes (dairy farms) is possible if
detailed trade data are used in the simulation. This may help risk
managers to identify critical points with regard to the entry
sources for a contamination in a food supply chain.
In addition, our research has proven that different trade structures
have a signiﬁcant impact on the number and the rank-order of
selected entry sources for contaminations. Our hypothesis, that the
number and the rank-order of milk producer nodes as entry sources
for a contamination may vary due to the different trade ﬂows of milk
(Figs. 2 and 3(b)), was conﬁrmed and can be underpinned by the
following facts: First, the number of milk producer nodes as portals of
entry for a pathogen to induce a worst-case situation varies within
and between the contingency plans per simulation (min: 7|13; max:
15|20). The entry sources that exist regardless of the kind of trade, i.e.
with or without inter-dairy trade (Fig. 4(a)), have a very different
impact on the damage situation. It is not possible to tell that milk
producer nodes identiﬁed as important in one of the contingency
plans are also important in the other plan or vice versa. The
simulations showed that trade between the dairies leads to a
signiﬁcant change of the potential entry sources for a contaminations.
If the trade of milk between dairies is taken into account
(Fig. 2(b)), more diversity at potential entry sources per rank-order
becomes visible as compared to the list without inter-dairy trade
(Fig. 3(b)). This observation can be underpinned by the fact that there
were 50% more potential entry sources for contaminations on
the ﬁrst 13 ranks compared to the list of portals of entry for the
network without inter-dairy trade (Figs. 2 and 3(b)). The consequence
of this large number of entry sources for contaminations per rank is
that no general statement can be made, which allows to select
milk producer nodes that need to be monitored to mitigate the
maximum damage. One consequence of a non-speciﬁc selection of
the control points would be a delay in coping with the damage
situation. In this context, a potential attacker runs a higher risk to
select a milk producer node that is not relevant for the spread of the
contamination as the selection is highly dependent on the respective
milk trade ﬂow, in contrast to the contingency plan without inter-
dairy trade (Fig. 3(b)). Three milk producer nodes (ID: 100; 63; 47)
appeared always on the same rank and on the ﬁrst ranks in all
simulations without inter-dairy trade. This means that a potential
attacker could reach almost all consumer nodes via these entry
sources. Milk producer nodes on the ﬁrst rank can reach 68% of the
consumer nodes (Fig. 3). The importance of these milk producer
nodes as entry sources can be explained by the fact that these milk
producer nodes delivered their milk to different dairy nodes. In a
previous study it was shown that milk producer nodes delivered their
milk on average to three different dairy nodes whereas some milk
producer nodes delivered to up to 20 different dairy nodes [31].
Consequently, more trade connections in the milk trade network
existed. If an attacker would choose a milk producer node from the
ﬁrst rank in the contingency plan with inter-dairy trade, 94% of
consumer nodes could be reached. The importance of the milk
producer nodes for the spread of the contamination in the inter-
dairy trade network was shown by [32]. It was calculated that the
spread of contaminated milk through some milk producer nodes
could be higher if trade between dairy nodes existed. Generally, the
importance of the inter-dairy trade for the spread of a contamination
is illustrated by the fact that 30% of the total milk production in
Germany is traded between dairies [31]. A detailed description of the
German milk supply chain can be found in [31].
One of the limitations of the model results from the fact that the
number of milk producer nodes not involved in the spread of a
contamination in our model can be less than 60%, because the greedy
algorithm cannot consider the theoretical case that twomilk producer
nodes may cause exactly the same extent of damage. In contrast to
the model of Wein and Liu [13], our model does not include
microbiology, processing, time-resolved delivery structures and com-
pliance with existing security measures such as International Food
Standard (IFS), British Retail Consortium (BRC) or Hazard Analysis
and Critical Control Points (HACCP) etc., which may already exist at
different levels of the milk supply chain and could inﬂuence the
dimension of potential damage as well as the selection of the poten-
tial entry sources for contaminations. Another limitation is
that the hypothetical attacker must process the complete data set
to plan the attack beforehand and implement the scenario, which is
unlikely in reality. A further limitation of this study is that the gravity
model used to generate the trade network was only based
on three variables (supply, demand and distances between actors),
although it is well known that additional variables, such as the price
of traded goods [44] are also important for the decision whether or
not trade relations between actors take place [32]. An overview of the
economic factors, which are essential for the choice of supplier
partners in dairy industry, is given by [54]. Apart from economic
factors, effects of terrorism on supplier selection require more
attention [55]. Whereby, selection of supplier is a multi-criteria
decision making [55–59].
However, it has been shown by this study that for the decision
makers the type and number of trading partners can have a signiﬁcant
impact on the range of a damage situation. Furthermore, the suppliers,
which should ﬁnd more consideration in the operational-control-
system of the dairies, were illustrated by means of the contingency
plan. This information can inﬂuence the decision making in the
supplier selection process. The surveillance activities for selected
scenarios can be reduced by half by decision makers, if current data
on trade ﬂows are present. Nonetheless, it was shown in this work
that an increased transparency or a high availability of data about the
supply structure can lead to a maximal damage with minimal efforts
based on the selection of suitable entry sources for a potential attacker.
The protection of supplier data is essential in order to avoid such a
scenario and therefore for food defense issues in the context of ERM.
Further research will focus on the kind of agencies or speciﬁc
stages of the production process, which can inﬂuence the number
of consumers reached, the kind of selected entry sources for a
deliberate contamination and the assessment of the consequences
related to deliberate contamination. This will be done with the help
of the ﬁndings gained here.
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